The purpose of this FDD Visual is to provide an overview of the date, quantity, and location of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan compared to U.S. military responses since October 17, 2023.
Locations for attacks on U.S. forces are displayed on the map by the base or group of bases the adversary attacked. These attacks are also categorized by date (local time) and country. Adversary attacks on U.S. forces are considered as one incident if it/they occurred within a 10-hour period at a single base. If multiple bases with U.S. troops are attacked, each of those bases attacked constitutes a separate attack. If attacks occurred at least 10 hours apart, they are recorded as separate incidents, even if they were against the same base. Attacks on U.S. forces are only counted if at least two credible non-DOD sources reported the attack, the U.S. government confirms the specific attack occurred, or the Pentagon provides some additional information regarding an attack reported by one credible non-DOD source. If there is a doubt whether an apparent attack occurred, it is not counted, likely resulting in a slight undercounting of actual attacks on U.S. forces.
A U.S. military response is considered as one incident if it occurs within a 10-hour period, regardless of the quantity of munitions fired or the number of locations struck, to reflect the fact that the U.S. military has launched large, single operations rather than a steady stream of small strikes. U.S. military responses conducted more than 10 hours apart are considered separate responses, even if the response is against the same location. When it responds, the United States often strikes multiple targets in different locations, and it is not always possible to identify each precise location via open-source methods. Therefore, U.S. military response locations are not displayed on the map and are simply categorized by date (local time) and the country in which they occurred. If a response commences late in the evening and goes into the next morning but does not last more than 10 hours, the date when the attack started is recorded. Self-defense strikes (i.e. destroying a drone or rocket launcher that is an imminent threat to US forces) are distinct from retaliatory strikes in response to attacks on U.S. forces and are not represented in this methodology as the goal of this project is to analyze the policy decisions made by the U.S. government in responding to attacks that have already taken place, not counting the number of times U.S. forces exercise their inherent right of self-defense.
The different accounting methods for the number of adversary attacks and U.S. responses was selected to generally align the methodology with the Pentagon’s approach and to more accurately reflect the different strategies being employed by the United States and its adversaries. If there is a slight discrepancy between this dataset and what the Pentagon is reporting, it is likely due to different “as of date” for the data or this dataset’s 10-hour rule. It is unclear how many hours the Pentagon believes must pass before an attack is counted as a separate incident.
Sources include media reports, official U.S. government statements, and claims made in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s (IRI’s) Telegram posts. Although IRI statements should not be taken at face value, the majority were corroborated by other media reports. IRI-claimed attacks that could not be confirmed by reputable sources have been scrutinized and only added when their addition aligns with Pentagon information. Information provided by the Department of Defense is considered authoritative.
In this methodology, an attack involving one unmanned aerial system is counted the same as an attack involving many rockets. Similarly, a U.S. response that struck 85 targets within a 10-hour period is only counted as one response. Accordingly, this approach provides a general sense of the date, location, and number of discrete adversary attacks and U.S. responses but does not provide insight into their scale, complexity, or effectiveness.
Mike Daum and Analyse Hughes, research interns in FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power, contributed to this project.