FEB 2021
Biden rescinds Trump's snapback of UN Iran sanctions under JCPOA implementing resolution 2231
FEB. 2021
Iran stops implementing Additional Protocol & JCPOA monitoring measures, which give the lAEA greater insight into Tehran's nuclear activities. Absent these, IAEA access & monitoring at nuclear sites are restricted. Tehran threatens to destroy IAEA data & makes 3.6 grams of uranium metal (used in nuclear weapon cores). IAEA detects undeclared uranium at two sites
APR. 2021
At Natanz PFEP, Iran begins using advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity, or 99 percent of the effort necessary to reach WGU. At Natanz FEP, Iran uses 1,044 IR-2m centrifuges and 348 IR-4s to enrich uranium up to 5 percent purity
APR - JUN 2021
P5+1 (US. France, Germany, UK, Russia & China) hold six rounds of indirect nuclear talks with Rouhani government
MAY 2021
Iran's enriched uranium stockpile grows to >3,200 kilograms. IAEA must estimate stockpile due to Tehran's reductions in agency monitoring
JUNE 2021
Ultra-hardiner Ebrahim Raisi selected to be president of Iran; nuclear talks stall
AUG 2021
Raisi inaugurated
AUG. 2021
Iran produces 200 grams of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent
NOV - DEC 2021
P5+1 & Raisi government
restart nuclear talks
DEC. 2021
Iran starts enriching 20 percent uranium using a cascade of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow plant, providing fast route to WGU production at a highly fortified facility
DEC 2021 - JAN 2022
Iran relocates advanced centrifuge manufacturing and assembly capabilities to underground sites at Natanz and Esfahan
MAR 2022
Nuclear talks stall, apparently due to Iran’s demand that the U.S. lift terrorism designation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
MAR. 2022
IAEA and Iran agree to a timetable for Iranian cooperation with IAEA investigation into undeclared nuclear material and activities
JUNE 2022
IAEA Board of Governors passes censure resolution against Iran
JUNE 2022
IAEA Board of Governors passes censure resolution against Iran
NOV 2022
IAEA Board of Governors passes new censure of Iran
NOV 2022
Iran produces 60 percent enriched uranium at Fordow and plans to install some 2,600 IR-6 centrifuges there
JAN 2023
Iran violates IAEA safeguards agreement by not declaring change to enrichment configuration at Fordow; IAEA detects presence of uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent, near weapons grade or 90 percent
MAR 2023
IAEA Board fails to pass new censure of Iran
MAR 2023
Independent estimates find Iran has enough enriched uranium to make WGU for seven atomic weapons within three months. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile grows to >3700 kilograms. IAEA reports no progress regarding investigation into undeclared nuclear material and activities.
FEB. 2021
Biden rescinds Trump's snapback of UN Iran sanctions under JCPOA implementing resolution 2231
FEB 2021
Iran stops implementing Additional Protocol & JCPOA monitoring measures, which give the lAEA greater insight into Tehran's nuclear activities. Absent these, IAEA access & monitoring at nuclear sites are restricted. Tehran threatens to destroy IAEA data & makes 3.6 grams of uranium metal (used in nuclear weapon cores). IAEA detects undeclared uranium at two sites
APR 2021
At Natanz PFEP, Iran begins using advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity, or 99 percent of the effort necessary to reach WGU. At Natanz FEP, Iran uses 1,044 IR-2m centrifuges and 348 IR-4s to enrich uranium up to 5 percent purity
APR - JUN. 2021
P5+1 (US. France, Germany, UK, Russia & China) hold six rounds of indirect nuclear talks with Rouhani government
MAY 2021
Iran's enriched uranium stockpile grows to >3,200 kilograms. IAEA must estimate stockpile due to Tehran's reductions in agency monitoring
JUNE 2021
Ultra-hardiner Ebrahim Raisi selected to be president of Iran; nuclear talks stall
JUNE 2021
Raisi inaugurated
AUG 2021
Iran produces 200 grams of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent
NOV - DEC. 2021
P5+1 & Raisi government
restart nuclear talks
DEC 2021
Iran starts enriching 20 percent uranium using a cascade of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow plant, providing fast route to WGU production at a highly fortified facility
DEC 2021 - JAN 2022
Iran relocates advanced centrifuge manufacturing and assembly capabilities to underground sites at Natanz and Esfahan
MAR. 2022
Nuclear talks stall, apparently due to Iran’s demand that the U.S. lift terrorism designation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
MAR 2022
IAEA and Iran agree to a timetable for Iranian cooperation with IAEA investigation into undeclared nuclear material and activities
JUNE 2022
IAEA Board of Governors passes first censure resolution against Iran in
JUNE 2022
Tehran reduces IAEA monitoring and announces plans to install hundreds more IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz FEP
NOV 2022
IAEA Board of Governors passes new censure of Iran
NOV 2022
Iran produces 60 percent enriched uranium at Fordow and plans to install some 2,600 IR-6 centrifuges there
JAN 2023
Iran violates IAEA safeguards agreement by not declaring change to enrichment configuration at Fordow; IAEA detects presence of uranium particles enriched to 83.7 percent, near weapons grade or 90 percent
MAR 2023
IAEA Board fails to pass new censure of Iran
MAR 2023
Independent estimates find Iran has enough enriched uranium to make WGU for seven atomic weapons within three months. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile grows to >3700 kilograms. IAEA reports no progress regarding investigation into undeclared nuclear material and activities