U.S. and Israeli Strikes Accomplished
What the JCPOA Failed To Do

JCPOA provisions — what the accord permitted or allowed to expire — are on the left. Actual strike and diplomatic outcomes — what has happened since 2020 — are on the right. Each column follows its own chronology.

Photo — Getty Images

JCPOA & UNSCR 2231 Provisions What expired or was permitted under the 2015 accord
Actual Events Strikes, snapback & diplomatic outcomes

The flawed 2015 deal with Iran (the JCPOA) contained sunset provisions that would have progressively dismantled all restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program by 2031, leaving it with uncapped enrichment capacity powered by advanced centrifuges.

Iran would have a near-zero breakout timeline and no remaining international legal constraints — it would be a nuclear threshold state.

U.S. and Israeli military strikes have destroyed or rendered inaccessible virtually every link in Iran’s nuclear weapons supply chain.

Reimposed sanctions temporarily lifted under the JCPOA and sustained U.S. economic pressure have also devastated the regime’s economy.
Oct. 2020 — Expired
  • UN conventional arms embargo on imports to and exports from Iran lapsed
  • Select UN-sponsored visa bans on Iranian officials lifted
Oct. 2020 — Lapsed as written
  • Arms embargo expired per UNSCR 2231; Iran moved to acquire conventional weapons from Russia and China
Oct. 2023 — Expired
  • UN-sponsored ban on imports/exports of missile-related equipment and technology expired
  • UN prohibition on Iranian ballistic missile launches ended
  • U.S. and EU/UK sanctions on select proliferation-linked entities lapsed
  • UN-sponsored asset freezes on select entities terminated
Oct. 2023 — Lapsed as written
  • Missile and drone embargoes expired; Iran accelerated ballistic missile transfers to Russia and expanded its regional proxy arsenal
  • Iran continued advancing enrichment to 60%, accumulating material sufficient for up to 22 weapons once further refined
2024–2026 — Would have been permitted or expired
  • Advanced centrifuge R&D restrictions would have begun to sunset; mechanical testing of IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, and IR-8 centrifuges would have been allowed
  • Uranium-fed tests in single and multi-centrifuge cascades of IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 models would have been allowed
  • Up to 5,060 IR-1s would have been allowed to enrich at Natanz; 1,044 IR-1s held idle at Fordow; IR-6 estimated at 5x IR-1 output
  • Tests with up to 30 IR-6 and 30 IR-8 centrifuges would have been permitted; manufacture of up to 200 IR-6 and 200 IR-8 per year — without rotors — would have been allowed
  • JCPOA procurement channel would have dissolved, removing oversight of nuclear-related imports
  • Past UNSC resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear program would have terminated; UN procurement channel for nuclear-related imports would have ended
  • “Snapback” mechanism to restore international sanctions would have expired Oct. 18, 2025
Jun. 2025 — Operations Rising Lion & Midnight Hammer
Enrichment & Fuel Cycle12
  • Karaj (TABA/TESA) centrifuge manufacturing complex nearly entirely demolished — industrial base for IR-6 and IR-8 production eliminated
  • Tehran Nuclear Research Center centrifuge testing and development facility — destroyed
  • Kalaye Electric centrifuge testing site — destroyed
  • Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (yellowcake to UF6) eliminated — enrichment fuel supply severed
  • Isfahan Central Chemical Laboratory destroyed
  • Isfahan Fuel Plate Manufacturing Plant (FPFP) destroyed — Tehran reactor fuel manufacturing eliminated
  • Isfahan Uranium Powder Plant (EUPP) destroyed — UO2 fuel powder production eliminated
  • A new Isfahan enrichment plant being constructed in underground tunnels was rendered inaccessible after strikes
  • Above-ground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz destroyed; underground Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) severely damaged by GBU-57 bunker busters — cascades likely inoperable
  • Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant struck by 12 GBU-57 MOPs — severe underground structural damage; assessed “off the table”
  • Enriched uranium stockpiles at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan believed entombed under rubble
  • Arak (Khondab) heavy-water reactor containment structure and part of heavy-water production plant struck — plutonium pathway disrupted; Hot Cells production building also struck
Weapons-grade uranium metal production3
  • Isfahan Uranium Metal Conversion Lab destroyed — lab-scale weapons-grade uranium metal production eliminated
  • Isfahan Fuel Plate Manufacturing Plant (FPFP) uranium metal line destroyed — pilot-scale weapons-grade uranium metal production eliminated
  • Shahid Meisami Research Complex (near Karaj) — produced metallurgical equipment relevant to fissile core fabrication — struck twice
Weaponization — administration & R&D4
  • SPND headquarters (Nour complex, Tehran) struck and destroyed
  • Lavisan 2/Mojdeh campus (Tehran) — former SPND HQ — struck: buildings housing the Shahid Karimi Group, Institute of Applied Physics Annex, and Modern Defense Readiness Test Center destroyed
  • Shahid Shariarti — R&D radiation and explosives facility — destroyed
  • Weaponization site near Natanz — IDF-confirmed strike on unnamed facility containing unique components and specialized equipment for nuclear weapons development
Weaponization — multipoint initiation system2
  • Sanjarian (Tehran Province) — Amad Plan/SPND shockwave generator development and testing site — struck twice; all buildings completely destroyed
  • Shahid Karimi Group/Lavisan 2 Mojdeh site — multipoint initiation system development and testing — destroyed (part of Lavisan 2 campus strikes above)
Weaponization — neutron initiator production1
  • Unidentified neutron initiator production site — destroyed
Scientific personnel12
  • 12 nuclear scientists and weapons experts eliminated, including specialists in nuclear engineering, reactor physics, chemistry, materials science, and centrifuge design
Diplomatic2
  • Aug. 28, 2025: E3 triggered snapback — restoring all prior UNSC resolutions before the Oct. 18 expiry deadline, including lapsed provisions (arms embargo, asset freezes, travel bans, missile and drone embargoes, sanctions on proliferation-linked entities)
  • Oct. 18, 2025: JCPOA formally terminated; UN resolutions now prohibit Iranian enrichment and reprocessing
2027–2029 — Would have been permitted
  • 2,500-3,500 IR-2m or IR-4 centrifuges would have been installed at Natanz — output potentially exceeding all 5,060 permitted IR-1s
  • IR-8 infrastructure would have been installed at Natanz; rotors fitted to stockpiled IR-6 and IR-8 machines under IAEA monitoring
  • Uranium tests in cascades of up to 150 IR-6 and 84 IR-8 would have been permitted
Feb.–Apr. 2026 — Operations Roaring Lion & Epic Fury
Enrichment & Fuel Cycle5
  • Natanz FEP facility entrances and security points struck — IAEA confirmed damage
  • Isfahan nuclear complex air defense/command post structures struck — IAEA confirmed additional damage
  • Ardakan yellowcake production facility (Yazd Province) struck — ore-to-feedstock pipeline disrupted
  • Arak heavy-water production plant struck again
  • Lashkar Ab’ad former secret laser enrichment facility/site of continued R&D — struck
Weaponization facilities9
  • Taleghan 2 (Parchin) — High-explosives test chamber, originally struck Oct. 2024 and rebuilt with a reinforced concrete sarcophagus — struck again (March 2026) with three bunker buster penetrations directly into the containment vessel
  • Shahid Boroujerdi (Parchin) — Underground facility previously built to produce weapons-grade uranium metal cores and cast them into weapon hemispheres — current purpose unknown — struck
  • Min-Zadayi — Secret nuclear weapons reconstitution site; uranium metallurgy / fissile core fabrication — struck
  • Shahid Chamran Group HQ — SPND nuclear and explosives R&D headquarters complex — destroyed
  • Malek Ashtar University — workshop associated with nuclear weapons research — destroyed
  • Lavisan 2/Mojdeh engineering laboratory building — SPND-linked R&D facility — destroyed
  • Imam Hossein University physics center buildings — nuclear program R&D — destroyed
  • Shahid Beheshti University — possible neutron initiator R&D capacity — destroyed
  • Shahid Meisami Research Complex (near Karaj) — possible reconstruction activity — struck again, twice
Scientific personnel & diplomacy8
  • 8 additional nuclear scientists eliminated, per Prime Minister Netanyahu
  • U.S.-Iran ceasefire announced April 7, 2026
  • FDD assesses: full irreversible dismantlement still requires verified disclosure, destruction of remaining centrifuge infrastructure, and unrestricted IAEA inspections
2029 — All centrifuge restrictions would have lifted
  • No further limits on advanced centrifuge manufacture or enrichment would have applied
  • Up to 1,200 IR-6 and 1,200 IR-8 centrifuges could have been stockpiled by this date
  • Breakout time would have been reduced to weeks or less — Iran would have been a de facto nuclear threshold state

These thresholds were never reached. Iran is not enriching uranium for the first time in nearly 20 years. No functioning enrichment facilities, feedstock production, or accessible HEU stockpile currently exist. Scientific knowledge and some pre-built centrifuges are likely retained. Iran’s pre-strike stockpile (~22 weapons’ worth of enriched material) remains unverified by IAEA.

2031 — JCPOA would have fully expired
  • No cap on enrichment purity level or enriched uranium stockpile would have applied
  • Enrichment at Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant would have been permitted; new enrichment plants permitted
  • Plutonium reprocessing prohibition would have been lifted; heavy-water reactors permitted; no cap on heavy-water production or stockpiling
  • No limits on centrifuge types or quantities would have remained
  • Powered by a fully deployed fleet of advanced centrifuges, Iran would have faced near-zero breakout time — able to produce weapons-grade uranium within days

The JCPOA was formally terminated Oct. 18, 2025 — six years before its planned termination. UN resolutions now prohibit enrichment and reprocessing and missile and military embargoes are in place. The conditions this section describes will not arrive.

The near-zero breakout timeline, foreclosed

Strikes have eliminated Iran’s entire enrichment fuel supply chain — destroying the Isfahan uranium conversion facility and the centrifuge manufacturing base; severely damaging or rendering inaccessible the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow; and burying an enrichment plant in the Isfahan tunnels that was under construction.

The uranium metal conversion and fuel fabrication lines at Isfahan that could have been used to create nuclear weapon cores have been eliminated. Iran’s plutonium pathway has been closed by strikes on the Arak reactor, and UN resolutions now prohibit enrichment and reprocessing.

Without accessible enriched uranium feedstock, functioning centrifuges, or operational enrichment halls, Iran cannot produce the fuel needed for a nuclear weapon — and the near-zero breakout window the JCPOA’s 2031 expiration would have delivered has been foreclosed.

Sources

Created using the above sources with structural design and populating assistance from Claude AI.

Research by Andrea Stricker. Visual by Pavak Patel and Jason Fields.